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DESCRIPTION

The city of Detroit is located in the southeast region of Michigan. With its
highly developed transportation infrastructure and proximity to Canada and
Chicago, it has functioned as a key center in the manufacturing industry for
nearly one hundred years. Detroit's population, 1,027,974 in 1990 and estimated to be just less than a million in 2000, has been steadily decreasing from
its 1970 population of 1,511,336. Demographic data from the 1990 census indicated that 76 percent of Detroit's population is Mrican American and 22 percent is white (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2000).
Data from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) indicates important and troubling trends in the socioeconomic status of Detroit's
residents. Despite a decline in Detroit's estimated poverty rate between 1993 and
1995,1 the figure remained more than double the 1969 rate of 14.7. Additionally, in 1989 approximately 40 percent of Detroit's population was considered
low income, and only 11 percent was considered high income. The number
considered low income was double the 1969 figure of approximately 20 percent. Ivlost alarming, the median adjusted family income in 1998 dollars decreased from a high of nearly $45,000 in 1969 to approximately $30,000 in
1989. These data suggest an economic decline took place in Detroit during the
1970s and 1980s. Most of the economic downturn was associated with the dramatic decline in manufacturing, especially that related to the auto industry.
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PATTERNS

Detroit's crime trends show a mixed pattern. While the levels of some major
crimes have attenuated in the past several years, the decline has not been as
dramatic in other crime categories. Although the frequency and rate of violent
crimes such as murder and robbery have decreased during recent years, there
were troubling increases in aggravated assaults and burglary between 1995 and
1998.
Table 9.1 details changes in Detroit's crime between 1995 and 1999.2 Data
reflect both the total number of reported crimes in each crime category, and
crime rates per 100,000. Considering Detroit's declining population in recent
years, it is important to consider both of these figures. Detroit experienced an
overall decrease in homicides between 1995 and 1999. The 453 homicides recorded in 1999 represent an approximately 16 percent decrease over the 1995
total, substantially lower (34 percent) than the 689 reported in 1987 (Michigan
State Police, 1988). Although homicides have decreased dramatically in Detroit,
the homicide rate, 47 per 100,000, remains substantially higher than the national
average of 16 per 100,000 for cities of similar size (Fox and Zawitz, 2000).

BRIEF

HISTORY

OF DETROIT

As with many other urban areas, the history of drugs and gangs in Detroit is intimately tied to its economic development. In his book Dangerous Society, Carl
Taylor (1990) provides an interesting and detailed insight into the evolution
of gangs in Detroit. During the industrial boom of the early 1900s to the mid1930s, many immigrants were attracted to the lure of quality, well-paying factory jobs. As immigrants moved into the city in greater numbers, neighborhoods were established along ethnic lines. The earliest gangs in Detroit can
be traced to the dynamics of these ethnic neighborhoods where loose groups
of youth banded together to "protect" local merchants and neighborhood residents from outsiders. One such group that was formed primarily to protect
Jewish merchants, the Sugar House Gang, eventually joined forces with another Detroit group to reap the financial rewards associated with distilling operations and other organized crime activities. Starting in the 1920s this new
gang, the Purple Gang,) represented one of Detroit's fIrSt true organized gang
syndicates.
Many African Americans migrated from the rural South to Detroit during
the 1940s and 1950s. Like many European ethnic groups, African Americans
were attracted by the promise of well-paying factory jobs. There were almost
immediately tensions between the growing black population and "vhites. African Americans were generally restricted to living in a few neighborhoods in the
eastern side of the city, and many found it difficult to gain quality employment.
Growing tensions and distrust eventually resulted in two riots that would change
Detroit forever.

CHAPTER 9

N
.•....m
t.n
N
0
c: •......
0'\ 0
rwi'

oo::r

00 ,.,'" m'"

N

m

0'\ .•....
I.D I.D
-q"
N

NOCoM
.•.... \.C

\.C Ln

W

-q.••........ -q" N"

I.D N

-q -q co co co ,.-

THE ANTI-GANG

INITIATIVE

IN DETROIT

Two race riots in Detroit, in 1943 and 1967, have had a significant impact
on the nature of race relations in the city. The riot of 1943, caused mostly by
overcrowded conditions,4 segregation, and racism (Farley, Danziger, and Holzer, 2000; McGraw, 1999), did little to change the economic situation of African Americans. In the post-World War II period Detroit's economy boomed.
During the war, factory workers were paid generously and, because there was
a lack of durable goods production, they usually saved a good portion of their
wages. This, in conjunction with the growth in the national highway system,
caused a major boom in auto manufacturing. However, little was done to incorporate African Americans in the ensuing economic windfall. A later riot in
July of1967 resulted in a dramatic withdrawal of many of the businesses and industries that were instrumental to Detroit's economy.
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Gangs

In the early 1970s several social changes occurred simultaneously that set the
stage for a proliferation of street gangs in the city. Detroit's economy, along with
that of several other Michigan cities such as Flint and Saginaw, suffered from
tremendous cutbacks in the auto industry caused by the oil embargo and increased competition from Asian auto manufacturers. Around this same period,
a highly addictive drug, heroin, invaded Detroit's local drug markets.
As traditional social controls eroded and drug use increased, a delinquent
subculture started to pervade many once stable neighborhoods. Between 1971
and 1975 loosely affiliated groups of youth started to identify themselves with
street names. According to Taylor (1990), these gangs, which he refers to as
"scavenger" gangs, were composed of misfits.s The days ofloose1y organized
gangs did not last for long. Starting around 1975, gangs began to organize, especially on the east side of Detroit. The Errol Flynns and the Black Killers (BKs),6
two of the most recognizable organized gangs, were differentiated by their stylish clothes (Taylor 1990: 22). In 1979, allegedly with $80,000 from an insurance
payout for a murdered parent, t\vo young men in their 20s started Young Boys
. Incorporated (YBI), a gang that would eventually take over the heroin and cocaine industry in Detroit.7 This gang differed tremendously from other gangs
in that members intentionally recruited young boys to serve as street dealers
in their lucrative operation. Younger juveniles were recruited to avoid the increasingly punitive sanctions imposed on adults by criminal courts.
Using the pseudonym of Gang C-l for the gang presumed to be the notorious Young Boys Incorporated, Taylor (1990) revealed several important characteristics of this group that clearly delineated it from others in Detroit. First,
the gang had extensive operations that were carried out 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week. The operations were so extensive and elaborate that the gang actually
employed on-call legal advice. Second, the gang actively recruited teen members with promises of financial reward, and eventually began to compete with
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mainstream employers for "quality personnel." Third, gang members eventually became celebrities in the city, which increased the attractiveness of their
organization. YBI's reach became so extensive, at one point "employing" hundreds of Detroit's youth that it began to undermine several fundamental institutions in the city. For example, the lure of high-stakes financial"rewards diminished the perceived need for education.
A second and equally notorious drug organization developed during the
same time. Although not organized as a street gang per se, the drug enterprises
organized by the Chambers brothers remain important examples of the level of
organization in the dmg industry from the late 1970s until the late 1980s. Billy
Joeand Larry Chambers, two young men who grew up in abject poverty in rural Arkansas, founded two interrelated drug organizations that, according to
federal indictments, would eventually gross almost $3 million per day. William
Adler (1995) describes how these two entrepreneurs early on tried their hands
at real estate and small-time marijuana sales until the enormous' profits associated with the burgeoning crack market became apparent. The brothers became
icons in the Detroit community, and at one point employed nearly 300 people
and operated out of approximately 10 different locations. The level of organization in the enterprise was detailed to the point where there were formal procedures for processing payroll and established organizational rules, along with
accompanying "fines" for failure to comply. For example, a poster found at one
location identified the "fine for stealing among the group to be $300, speeding
when dropping off or picking up drugs as $100, and revealing secrets about the
organization as $500 (Adler, 1995: 240).
Gangs and the Drug Industry
Organized gang activity were closely linked to the heroin epidemic that hit
Detroit during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Mieczkowski, 1986). The traditional "dope pad" system of drug distribution in which a fIXed location functioned as a "retail center" for narcotics was replaced by the "runner" method.
The runner system was intended to take the narcotics to the customers (street
corners, front of shops, parks, and curbside). Street-level sales of heroin were coordinated using the quasibureaucratic style of Young Boys Incorporated (YBI).
According to Mieczkowski (1986), "the runner system is a multi-tiered, taskdirected organization system which serves a heroin consuming clientele" (648).
Runners were primarily younger males who were not regular users of "hard"
drugs; none were heroin addicts. Mieczkowski (1986) points out that there were
strict organizationalnon:ns discouraging drug use among members ofYBl. Although recreational use of drugs such as marijuana was common, organizational
imperatives strictly forbade the regular use of "hard" drugs such as heroin.
YBI's system ofherQin sales was highly organized and very lucrative.8
There is some indication that the influence of the YBI organization continued w11en crack made its way into Detroit's drug market (Phillips, 1991). However, research into Detroit's gang market contradicts this claim. Mieczkowski
(1990) argued that the dynamics of Detroit's crack market were decidedly dif-
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ferent than the heroin market. Detroit's crack market, at least the early crack
market, was characterized by "units of small entrepreneurs rather than by any
mega-organization that controls the crack trade" (Mieczkowski, 1990: 21). If
Mieczkowski's observations about Detroit's early crack market are accurate,
there are several important distinctions between it and the heroin market. First,
organized gangs seem to have played a less pwminent role in its development,
and second, many crack hustlers were also crack users that sold crack as a means
to support their own habit.
Mieczkowski's description of Detroit's crack market generally coincides
with Adler's (1995) account of the two drug organizations run by the Chambers brothers. Adler's account reveals that the brothers operated in the eastern
part of Detroit, and generally restricted their houses to a relatively small geographic area. Although the Chambers were major players in the crack market
at the time, there remained local competition by other reasonably big dealers
such as White Boy Rick Wershe, Frank Usher, Seal Murray, and Maserati Rick
Carter.
Assessing the Prevalence and Characteristics
of Contemporary Gangs in Detroit
It is difficult to get a complete picture of contemporary gangs in Detroit. First,
although Taylor's (1990) study is useful as a history of gangs in Detroit, much
has changed since its publication. Additionally, indictments of several leaders of
Young Boys Incorporated, the Chambers brothers, and others in the late 1980s
and early 1990s diminished their controlling power over the dmg industry in
Detroit. Mieczkowski's (1990) research provides some evidence that Detroit's
once hyperorganized drug industry is now more decentralized among various
smaller "crews."
The National Youth Gang Survey (NYGS) was instituted by the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to assessthe extent of gangs in various jurisdictions around the nation. This survey of law enforcement officials
collects data on the prevalence of gangs and their connection to crime. Officials
reported, on average, 125 active gangs functioning in the city of Detroit between
1996 and 1998. Although there was consistency in"the total number of gangs reported by the Detroit officials across years, there was considerable variation in the
reported total number of active gang members. The total number of reported
active gang members increased from 2,000 in 1996 to 3,500 in 1997, and then
decreased precipitously in 1998 to 800. The 1996 and 1997 figures, however,
are consistent with those of other cities of similar size. For example, cities with
populations over 250,000 reported an average of 5,894 active gang members in
1995 and 5,120 in 1997 (O]]DP, 1999). While these numbers are greatly influenced by large numbers reported in Chicago and Los Angeles (city and county),
they still suggest a considerable number of gang members per jurisdiction"
Data from the NGYS have consistently indicated that gang members in Detroit are intimately connected to the drug industry. Data from the 1996 survey suggested that almost one-fifth of all drug sales could be attributed to gang
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members. According to data from the 1997 survey, approximately 50 percent of
active gang members were involved in powder cocaine sales and 70 - 80 percent
were involved in the sale of crack or marijuana. These figures, however, are substantially higher than reported by cities of similar size and other cities located
in the Midwest. Statistics from 1997 indicated that approximately 50 percent9
of youth gangs were involved in street sales of narcotics, as were 45 percent 10
of youth gangs in the Midwest (OJJDP, 1999: 23). Additionally, the 1997 unweighted average of youth gangs from the Midwest involved in the distribution
of drugs was approximately 35 percent, and 37 percent for cities with populations over 250,000.
Data collected for the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) program
is another important source of data on the relationship between gangs, drugs,
and crime.lI Approximately 12 percent of individuals interviewed in Detroit
between 1995 and 1997 reported they were a member of a gang either presently or at some point in their past. Although methodologrcal considerations
preclude a definitive statement as to the overall prevalence of gang membership among arrested persons or the prevalence of criminal activity among gang
members, these data serve as an interesting proxy for the nexus between gang
membership and crime.
Interestingly, Detroit's ADAM data suggested no significant differences in
Crime
Type
the prevalence of drug use Murder
(as
indicated
by urinalysis
results) between individTotal
Weapon
offenses
SOURCE:
Robbery
Detroit
Police
Department.
Aggravated
assault
uals reporting gang membership and those not reporting gang membership.
Approximately 60 percent of both groups tested positive for any drug, just over
one-third tested positive for marijuana use only, and approximately 25 percent
tested positive for drugs other than marijuana. Huff (1996), finding contradictory evidence suggesting greater abuse of illegal substances by gang members,
reported the use and sale of drugs was considerably higher among self-reported
gang members.12 Although no significant differences were found in levels of
substance abuse among gang and non-gang members, ADAM data did reveal
important differences relating to patterns in gun use.
Approximately 25 percent of ADAM respondents in Detroit who reported
gang membership said they had stolen a gun for personal use at some point in
their past compared to 7 percent for non-gang members. Moreover, nearly onequarter of self-reported gang members indicated they had sold or traded a stolen
gun in the past, compared to just 7 percent of non-gang members. Based on
these findings, it is not surprising that self-reported gang members were significantly more likely to carry guns than non-gang members: Thirteen percent
of gang members reported they carried guns most or all of the time compared
to 4 percent of non-gang members.
Gang-Related

Crime in Detroit

It is difticult, using available data sources, to discern the exact level of gang participation in criminal activity. The Detroit Police Department's crime information system does not contain fields that denote "gang-related" crimes. Therefore, the authors decided to use a proximal measure of gang-related criminal
activities that was based on particular types of crimes.
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1997
1998
1996

2

1999
FIGURE 9.1 Gun-Related

Crime*

in Detroit

(1995-1999)

SOURCE: Detroit Police Department.
~ Murder, robbery, aggravated

assault, and weapon

offenses.

Table 9.2 Number of Gun-Related Crimes in Detroit,
1995-1999, by Type
1996
-7
-36
-17
-13
346
367
343
378
1999
1998
1997
-19
4,795
5,293
5,356
2,047
11,068
(%)
4,877
4,082
5,030
12,317
11,054
11,975
1,729
1,801
1,575
4,229
4,166
Difference

423
1995
5.416
13,341
2.468
5,034

1995-99

There is a well-established relationship between involvement in gangs and
criminal activity. One study of gangs in Cleveland and Columbus, Ohio reported that gang members were heavily involved in violent and property crime
(Huff, 1989). While the frequency of criminal offenses decreased with the seriousness of the crime, Huff (1989) reported that gang members in his study
participated in property crimes, robbery, rape, group rape, drug sales and use,
and murder. The authors considered violent crimes such as murder, robbery,
nondomestic aggravated assault, and weapon offenses crime categories that are
most likely associated with gang activity. We refined our definition of gangrelated crimes to include the above-specified categories that involved the use of
firearms. While not perfect, the use of these categories is consistent with findings from previous gang research.
Figure 9.1 demonstrates a downward trend in the total
related crimes in Detroit between 1995 and 1999. Gun-related
approximately 10 percent during those years. A decrease of
assaults between 1995 and 1997 (see Table 9.2) was followed

number of guncrimes decreased
621 gun-related
by a subsequent
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increase, bringing the levels close to those of 1995. Although the numbers of
murder, robbery, and weapon offenses experienced similar trends, increases between 1997 and 1998 were not large enough to nullifY the downward trend.
Thus, between 1995 and 1999 the rate of gun-involved crimes in Detroit exhibited a considerable decline.
Gangs in Detroit: Conclusion
These data, in conjunction with the historical observations made by Taylor
(1990), clearly indicate that gangs pose a significant problcm in the city of Detroit. Although there is some evidence that contemporary gangs are not as organized as in the days of Young Boys Incorporated and the Chambers brothers,
this does not suggest the net effects of their actions are any less serious. The decentralization of gangs may be associated with more rather than less violence.
Descriptions of Detroit's gangs by Taylor (1990) and Adler (1995) suggest specific organizational structures with fairly elaborate communication channels.
One would assume the communication channels included clear directives as to
"ownership" of particular territories. Since a sizable amount of gang violence
is associated with establishing territorial rights and with general competition
between various gangs (Decker and Van Winkle, 1996), the current lack of a
highly organized structure could result in an increasingly unstable drug market
where violence is more likely. Whatever the eventual effect of these structural
changes in gangs in Detroit over the past 15 years, data from the NYGS and
!\DAM program indicate that gang members continue to be heavily involved
in the sale and distribution of drugs, and also much more likely to have extensive experience with illegal firearms.

INITIATION

ANTI-GANG

OF

DETROIT'S

INITIATIVE

Detroit was one of 15 cities selected to participate in the Anti-Gang Initiative
(AGI) funded through the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services (COPS). The COPS office targeted grant funding
to cities with established and chronic problems with gangs and crime. The purpose of the AGI program was to foster the development of innovative and comprehensive strategies to combat gang-related disorder in several communities
throughout the nation,
Organizational

Structure and Gang Enforcement

Officers from the Detroit Police Department's Special Crimes Section (SCS)
have traditionally maintained responsibilities for gathering gang intelligence and
targeting gangs and gang-related crimes in the city. Although the primary responsibility of the SCS is to provide a uniform effort to combat gang-related
crime, its officers also serve an "on call" function where they are utilized for
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special events and situations requiring intensive policing efforts. For instance,
officers from the SCS were frequently used as a high-visibility security force
during parades and festivals. Interviews with officers indicated that, at times,
their "on call" status was detrimental to maintaining intensive gang investigation and enforccment.
Three principles were at the core of Detroit's AGI efforts. First, grant funds
supported the development of a new unit within the SCS that would focus only
on gang-related crime and disorder. Second, the project'recognized
the need
for geographic integrity, or concentrating intervention efforts in an identified
section of the city. Geographic integrity was important to Detroit's AGI program because previous gang enforcement efforts in Detroit were generally citywide and rarely focused on small geographic areas for considerable periods. Two
specific target areas, the Fourth and Ninth Precincts, were identified for the delivery of the intervention. Finally, Detroit Police Department (DPD) command
staff argued it would be necessary to draw on the knowledge and expertise of
both SCS officers and patrol officers in the Fourth and Ninth Precincts. Although SCS officers had comprehensive knowledge of Detroit's gangs, they often did not have the same level of knowledge about the day-to-day issues in each
precinct that patrol officers had. Thus, the newly created unit actively rccruited
SCS officers and precinct patrol officers with knowledge of their respective precincts into a new unit called the Gang Specialist Unit (GSU).
The partnership between the SCS and patrol officers served several functions. Officers who were previously assigned as precinct patrol officers provided
an in-depth understat1ding of the nature of crime in each of the two precincts,
knowledge of actual offenders, including gang members, knowledge of the main
geographic locations of gang-related activity, and knowledge of and contact
with community groups and organizations in each precinct. Officers who were
previously assigned to the SCS provided knowledge about citywide gang issues,
including historical trends in intracity gang migration, specialized gang intelligence, and techniques effective for the successful investigation and prosecution
of gang members. This partnership created an ideal marriage between knowledge of gangs and knowledge of the particular locations of gang activity.
Policing research continues to debate the efficacy of centralized versus decentralized policing functions. As with results from other cities, there have been
both positive and negative consequences to this traditional centralized enforcement unit. Centralization can be useful to gather intelligence, coordinate intensive efforts, and ensure uniformity. In situations where danger is potentially
imminent and control is desired, centralized command structures can be effective to gain compliance (Bayley, 1994). Earlier in the chapter we detailed characteristics of gangs in Detroit that make a centralized enforcement component
attractive.
Many critics have strongly challenged the role of specialized units within police departments (Bayley, 1.994; Walker, 1992). Informal working relationships
in police departments tend to be based on day-to-day interactions with individuals from one's immediate work group. When and if conflict arises between
various components of an organization, individuals tend to view the conflict
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from the perspective of their unit (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977). In police organizations, strong rivalries can also arise that not only create an unhealthy level
of competition between units, but also can impede effective completion of job
activities. DPD command staff felt the strategy of integrating members of the
SCS with precinct patrol officers would help alleviate problems with interunit
competition, which according to interviews with police officers was previously
a problem in Detroit.
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In general, the gang> in the target precincts can be characterized as quasiscavenger gangs. As described by Taylor (1990), scavenger gangs are likely to
be loosely organized with no clear organizational structure. However, there is
some level of organization among these gan"gs. The Headbangers and Latin
Counts, for example, were reported to have smaller groups with expertise in
burglary, robbery, or drug sales. This characterization is consistent with Taylor's 1990 observations characterizing gangs in the Fourth and Ninth Precincts
as scavenger gangs. 13

Gangs in the Target Precincts
Gang activity in the Fourth and Ninth Precincts was in some ways similar and
in others very different. The Headbangers gang is composed primarily of African Americans and tends to control a significant amount of the territory in the
Ninth Precinct. This gang does not appear to be organized ~ith any definitive
structure, but their criminal activities tend to be somewhat more coordinated
than those of other gangs. In general, however, the Headbangers gang is composed of loosely affiliated gangs identified by their control over certain streets.
These various gangs tend to unifY mostly when confronting a common enemy,
such as an outside gang attempting to take over their territory. This type of
loose alliance is similar to that explained by Spergel (1964: 64), in which white
ethnic gangs would occasionally join forces to battle African American or
Puerto Rican gangs. Compared to other gangs in Detroit, the Headbangers are
more discrete in how they display their "colors," or identifYing symbols such as
clothing or jewelry. Gang members often wear subtle identifiers such as beaded
necklaces with black and red beads or red shoelaces as insignias of their membership. It is not clear if this tendency is attributable to' police enforcement
efforts. Intelligence reports, crime data, and officers' perceptions suggested the
Headbangers are more heavily involved in the use and trafficking of firearms.
Additionally, intelligence reports indicated they are heavily involved in drug
sales and home invasions.
In contrast, gangs in the Fourth Precinct are predominantly Hispanic or
multiracial. The Latin Counts and Cash Flow Posse are the biggest gangs in the
precinct, and members of both are much more likely to openly display "colors" or other insignias of membership. This was especially true prior to the AGI
program. In many cases, each gang identifies itself with a particular college or
professional sports team and adopts the team's color scheme and clothing for
their gang_ For example, members of the Cash Flow Posse are identified by their
tradition of wearing University of North Carolina sports clothing. Non-gang
members living in active gang areas are likely to not wear these clothing lines
because of the common perception that the clothes denote gang membership.
Fourth Precinct gangs are more territorial than those in the Ninth Precinct.
Gang disputes often result from perceived outsiders attempting to control particular city blocks. Fourth Precinct gangs are also heavily involved in other
criminal activity such as drug sales, home invasions, assaults, and robberies. Intelligence reports suggest these gangs are less organized and are more likely to
operate in an ad hoc fashion.

Suppression Component
Police strategies to combat youth gangs primarily involve the use of suppression
strategies (Decker and Curry, 2000; Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor, 1999; Spergel
and Curry, 1990). Suppression strategies resemble a "crackdown," in which police use tactics such as saturation patrol and aggressive enforcement of ordinance
violations to make it difficult for gang members to operate freely (Fritsch, Caeti,
and Taylor, 1999; Spergel and Curry, 1990). A survey of 254 law enforcement
agencies around the natiDn indicated suppression strategies were the primary
method used by law enforcement agencies to combat gang-related disorder
(Decker and Curry, 2000: 565).
The Anti-Gang Initiative in Detroit incorporated several of these elements
into its program model. There were two primary components to the suppression strategy. The first imolved traditional crackdown responses such as aggressive enforcement of city ordinances, including curfew and truancy sweeps. Since
precincts are still rather large geographic areas, tactical patrol strategies were
devised to target smaller geographic areas in each precinct referred to as "scoutcar areas." Hot spots for gang activity within each precinct were identified from
crime analysis and gang intelligence. Targeting scout-car areas made possible a
more substantial impact on a smaller geographical area, thereby concentrating
the effectiveness of the strategy. The suppression effort also incorporated a hybrid of the intensive supervision approach used by the Boston Police Department for Operation Night Light, which targeted violent juvenile offenders.
The Boston Police Department received national acclaim for its efforts to
proactively intervene with violent youth crime (Boston Police Department,
1996). Under its Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF), Boston implemented
several programs, including Operation Night Light, Operation Ceasefire, and
the Boston Gun Project, with the purpose of making the streets safer for the
general community. Operation Night Light was of particular interest to members of the DPD because its purpose was to formalize a relationship between
the police and probation officers. Members of the Detroit Police Department
went to Boston to determine what core aspects of the YVSF's efforts could be
integrated into the structure of the Anti-Gang Initiative.
Similar to Operation Night Light, the DPD established a cooperative agreement with the Michigan Department of Corrections to perform joint operations for the purpose of targeting gang members in the target areas. The probation officers participated in monthly ride-alongs with members of the Gang
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Specialist Unit, together targeting suspected gang members to determine if
they were abiding bi the conditions of their parole/probation.
Lists of suspected gang members were provided to probation and parole officers, who subsequently returned the list with information relevant to the Department of
Corrections. These teams visited individuals targeted for intervention during
ride-alongs that involved searches of the individuals and location. Probation
revocation petitions were filed for individuals found to be in violation of their
probation conditions. Violations usually involved use of proscribed substances
such as alcohol or illegal narcotics, contact with restricted individuals, 'or spending time at restricted locations. Intelligence provided by GSU officers might
also reveal behavior that violated restrictions.
Schools and school grounds were important locations for the suppression
and intervention efforts of the Gang Specialist Unit. Schools are appropriate locations to target resources directed at delinquency because they are important
during the developmental years of an adolescent's life (Gottfiedson, 1998). Unfortunately, schools themselves are also the location of many crimes. A 1998 report to the National Institute of Justice indicated that 60 percent of participants
in four middle schools in Detroit reported their school was located in gang territories, 41 percent reported they sometimes felt unsafe at school, 95 percent
reported they had witnessed a crime in the past two months, and 66 percent reported they witnessed a student with a weapon at school (Bynum et aI., 1998:
73-76).
Officers from the Gang Specialist Unit regularly (at least once a week) visited schools (usually middle schools) in the target areas. During each visit, officers would speak briefly with school administrators and security personnel
to inquire about problem behavior. Officers regularly questioned individuals
hanging around the perimeter of the school during school hours, and often arrested persons illegally on school grounds for trespassing and/or truancy. GSU
officers spent considerable time informally talking with students while they
were in school. They would sometimes target the schools immediately after
school hours to increase their visibility and to informally interact with a larger
number of students.
Spergel and colleagues (1994) identified five basic strategies for dealing with
youth gangs: "(1) neighborhood mobilization; (2) social intervention, especially
youth outreach and work with street gangs; (3) provision for social and economic
opportunities, such as special school andjob programs; (4) gang suppression and
specialized probation units"; and (5) organizational change (p. 8). Neighborhood
mobilization strategies dominated during the 1920s and 1930s, and eventually
led into the social intervention approach of the 1940s and 1950s. Subsequently,
as concern about delinquency rose in the 1960s, the opportunities-based approach developed with the intent of increasing economic opportunities for impoverished individuals. Finally, the authors argued, as neighborhood resources
rapidly decreased during the 1970s and 1980s, strategic responses shifted primarily to police-initiated suppression efforts that focused almost exclusively on
community safety.
Recent research, however, indicates that suppression efforts alone rarely have
a sustained, long-term impact on crime. Although suppression strategies such
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as zero-tolerance curfew policies are being implemented at unprecedented rates
(Ruefle and Reynold, 1995), research continues to find that these strategies have
only mixed results in deterring crime. Dallas reported some positive results
from aggressive curfew and truancy enforcement, yet McDowall, Loftin, and
Wiersema (2000), in their study of the institution of a curfew ordinance, found
no significant differences in pre- and postintervention violent crime rates. This
study is somewhat limited in that it compares rates before and after the institution of the ordinance but does not consider the extent to which the ordinance
was actually enforced by patrol officers.
Vertical Prosecution Component
Vertical prosecution can be defined as one assistant prosecutor or small group
of assistant prosecutors handling one criminal complaint from start to finish
through the entire court process. In contrast, horizontal prose'cution is an organizational structure strategy whereby individual assistant prosecutors or a
small group of assistant prosecutors are responsible for certain phases of the adjudication of criminal complaints (for example, pretrial hearings, motions, and
arraignments). As early as 1980, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
was encouraging prosecutors to utilize vertical prosecution organizational strategies (Weimer, 1980). Today, many prosecutors' offices, especially in larger jurisdictions, have adopted vertical prosecution strategies to handle gang-related
crimes (Johnson, Webster, and Connors, 1995). The Wayne County Prosecutor's Office designated a prosecutor to act as a liaison to the gang unit and
oversee all gang-related prosecutions. This was a substantial change from the
way gang-related criminal prosecutions were handled prior to the Anti-Gang
Initiative.
Intervention Strategies
For gang strategies to be effective, they must include efforts that provide positive interventions into the life circumstances that are ultimately responsible for
delinquent cultures. Analyses of communities plagued by gang-related crime·
and disorder indicate they are beleaguered by extremely poor educational systems, high levels of crime, extensive levels of broken families, and a general lack
of opportunity (Anderson, 1999; Decker and Curry, 2000; Decker and Van
Winkle, 1996; Goldstein and Glick, 1994; Taylor, 1990; Thrasher, 1936). To
have long-lasting effects in the life circumstances of high-risk juvenile offenders, efforts must address the underlying etiology of the problem behavior (Hill
et aI., 1999; Reynolds, Chang, and Temple, 1998). Intervention strategies can
range from establishing alternative prosocial value systems for gang members
(Goldstein and Glick, 1994) to providing safe places for at-risk youth to participate in recreational activities (Thurman et aI., 1996).
The intervention efforts of members of the Gang Specialist Unit encompassed elements of both prevention and intervention. Information-based tactical deployment strategies were vital to the effectiveness of the DPD's Anti-Gang
Initiative. Directed aggressive patrol techniques in "hot spots," small geographic
areas with high levels of crime and community disorder, have proven effective
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in both Kansas City and Minneapolis (Sherman and Rogan, 1995; Sherman
and Weisburg, 1995). Maintaining geographic assignments in both the Fourth
and Ninth Precincts remained a central focus throughout the duration of the
program. Moreover, levels of gun- and gang-related crime were tracked on a
daily basis so that AGI personnel could be regularly assigned to the smaller geographic areas (scout-car areas) experiencing the most severe problems. Patrol
tactics involved zero-tolerance policies for city ordinances such as curfew, truancy, public consumption of alcohol, and gambling in public (for example,
shooting dice). AGI officers also utilized aggressive enforcement of traffic laws,
and made contact with the local known criminal element on a regular basis.
In addition to their patrol tactics, officers maintained regular contact with
local community members and groups. Officers regularly spoke to community
groups about the characteristics and dangers of gang-related behaviors in their
neighborhoods. On multiple occasions the officers also participated in community forums that included academics, service providers, the p'olice, conm1Unity
members, and former gang members. During interviews, the officers reported
that attending the meetings was important to their sense of staying connected to
the community. Additionally, attending meetings helped establish and encourage communication with the community.
Open communication with the community was important to this initiative. [n the past, as police organizations made conscious efforts to be "professional" organizations, many departments adopted an organizational structure
that stressed autonomy from the community (Greene, 1993). Public officials are
increasingly aware of the need to foster positive, proactive police-cC?mmunity
relationships. From the beginning of the development of the program, the Detroit Police Department stressed the need for increased responsiveness to the
community. Effective lines of communication can result in enhanced community satisfaction with police services and additional intelligence gathering from
community members ..
Intervention specialists have recently been advocating increased resources
for mentoring in order to offset potential serious delinquency (Anderson, 1994).
The mentoring component of the DPD's Anti-Gang Initiative was not formally integrated into the program model, but was administered informally by
several police officers. Several officers regularly participated in mentoring and
tutoring programs offered throughout the city. Officers met with juveniles and
assisted them with homework or simply spent time with them on weekends.
The officers reported that mentoring was personally rewarding and helped them
keep in touch with children living in their communities.
The Anti-Gang Initiative attempted to develop a comprehensive approach
to youthful gangs. From a program design perspective, the implementation of
the program closely resembled the program model. The most substantial successes were in designing a suppression strategy that integrated traditional approaches such as aggressive enforcement of criminal codes with contemporary
approaches such as tactical geographic assignments and intensive supervision.
The effects of these combined efforts strengthened this aspect of the program .
However, the program implementation fell short of instituting comprehensive
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intervention and prevention elements. Although the program was successful
in including prevention efforts such as gang awareness presentations, meetings
with community groups, and mentoring, these components lacked coordination and integration with other aspects of the project that could have increased
the effectiveness of this intervention.

METHODOLOGY
The evaluation used a quasi-experimental, case study approach to determine the
effectiveness of the prograrri in decreasing gang-related crime in the two target
precincts. It was important to select an additional precinct not subject to the intervention as a comparison area. Based on consultation with SCS administrators, the Eighth Precinct was selected. This precinct, located in the northwest
section of Detroit, is similar in geographic and population size to the Fourth and
Ninth Precincts. Additionally, intelligence reports indicated gang structures in
the control district were similar to those in the experimental area.14
The evaluation used four primary data sources: weekly arrest summaries
prepared by the GSU sergeants responsible for each project precinct, police offense and arrest data, field notes from observation periods, and interviews with
GSU officers. At the onset of the program, each sergeant maintained weekly
logs that identified each week's target neighborhood and detailed all arrests
made by the officers. This information was important because the information
system could not extract the exact arrests made by members of the Gang Specialist Unit. These data were used to quantifY the officers' activity.15 An analysis
was also conducted of Detro it's criminal offense and arrest data between 1995
and 1998. These data were utilized to reveal crime patterns for the target and
comparison district, including the extent of gang-related and gun-related incidents. Additionally, the evaluation team used observation strategies to observe
the tactics and strategies employed by members of the Gang Specialist Unit.
These ride-alongs were important because they provided an opportunity for
technical assistance with refining the program model and for assessing the extent to which many of the suppression and intervention strategies were operationalized. Finally, interviews were conducted with each member of the GSU.
The interviewers sought officers' opinions about the characteristics of gangs in
the Fourth and Ninth Precincts, the effectiveness of the AG [ model in achieving program goals, the extent of problems associated with the implementation
of the program, and suggested modifications to the program design.
It is important to once again note that it was difficult to determine gangrelated criminal incidents from Detroit's incident data. Gang-related offenses are
not among Detroit's crime classifications. The decision was made to use nondomestic gun-related crimes as proximal measures of gang crimes. As noted earlier, prior research indicates gang members are substantially more likely to use
firearms in the commission of crimes. Although officers indicated in interviews
that gang members in the Fourth Precinct were much less likely to carry fire. arms when compared to gang members in the Ninth, they did report that a
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substantial portion of gun-related crimes in the Fourth are attributable to gang
members. Thus, we are confident that gun-related crimes represent a conservative estimate of both gang crimes and crime that is of serious concern to the
community.

FINDINGS
Aggressive patrol and order maintenance were important components of the
DPD's Anti-Gang Initiative. Similarly, Spergel and colleagues (1994) supported
the consistent deployment of dedicated police units to small geographic areas.
This strategy provided a comprehensive body of knowledge about the nature
and characteristics of gangs and other delinquent groups in certain locations.
AGI officers aggressively enforced what are commonly refer·red to as "order
maintenance" violations. Although not criminal, order maintenance violations
such as curfew, truancy, littering, loitering, public gambling, and public urination provide additional opportunities for officers to prohibit or curtail quality
oflife problems that detract from the health and safety of communities. Windel
(1988), for example, reported that enforcement strategies that focused both on
serious crime and quality oflife problems were the most successful in creating
positive change for highly disorganized communities.
The weekly summaries collected by each sergeant were compiled for 1997,
the first full year of the AGI. Table 9.3 details the total number of arrests by
crime type for each precinct. During the intervention period, the Fourth Precinct reported a total of 475 arrests. The majority
1996 of arrests were for disorderly
Robberies
All
Gun
assaults
assaults
Homicides
Burglaries
SOURCE:
Detroit Police Department.
conduct (28 percent) followed closely by drug arrests (21 percent). For the
Ninth Precinct, arrests for disorderly conduct are substantially higher than for
any other crime category (41 percent). Arrests for weapon offenses are the next
largest category (13 percent), followed. closely by curfew, personal, and drugs
(11 percent). Important differences are revealed by these data. These data substantiate anecdotal evidence reported by officers about the nature of crime and
gang activity in each precinct. Officers continually reported that gang members
in the Ninth Precinct were more likely to carry firearms, and the data supported
this contention. Data from the Fourth Precinct similarly support the opinions
of officers that gang members were heavily involved in the drug market.
Arrests are not always the best measure of community disorder because they
can be heavily influenced by officers' discretion as to when to invoke their authority. There are, for example, several alternatives available to police when
confronted with criminal activity: outright release, release and submission of a
field contact report describing the circumstances, citation, or arrest/detention
(Piliavin and Briar, 1964: 208). There is reason to believe that the discrepancies
in arrest frequencies, especially for drug arrests, might be a function of enforcement tactics. As noted previously, weapons were viewed as the principal problem in the Ninth Precinct. Correspondingly, the Ninth Precinct crews were
more likely to make weapons arrests. Similarly, drugs were reported to be a ma-

---
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jor issue in the Fourth Precinct. Consequently drug offenses represented a significant proportion of the arrests of the Fourth Precinct crews.
Offenses reported to the police can serve as another measure of community
disorder. They may be a more objective indicator of problems because they are
citizen initiated rather than police initiated. Table 9.4 details changes in reported
crime in the experimental and comparison precincts between the fourth quarter of 1996 and fourth quarter of 1997. These time periods were selected because they measure levels of crime just prior to program implementation and
at the point where most of the components of the program had been fully im-
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plemented. Moreover, the analysis compares two time periods that are temporally similar. This technique controls for the potential biasing effect caused by
normal seasonal fluctuations in crime patterns.
The frequency of reported crime decreased remarkably in both the Fourth
and Ninth Precincts during the project period. The most substantial decrease
in reported crime was for gun-related assaults, an astounding 65 percent in the
Fourth Precinct and 72 percent in the Ninth Precinct. Between the two precincts, the figure represents a decrease of over 300 gun assaults. Both experimental precincts also recorded a substantial decrease in all assaults and robberies .
Robberies in the Ninth Precinct decreased over 80 percent, representing a decrease from 589 in the fourth quarter of 1996 to 271 in the fourth quarter of
1997. Similarly, robberies in the Fourth Precinct decreased by 50 percent, resulting in 70 fewer robbery victims. Although burglaries decreased in both target precincts, homicides decreased only in the Fourth Precinct (50 percent).
Once again, these figures represent a substantial decrease in both criminal offending and victimization over the project period.
A comparison of the reported decreases in criminal offending in the target
precincts to changes in crime in the control area (Eighth Precinct) reveals important differences. Since the Eighth Precinct was similar in size, demographic
compbsition, and gang structures, it was considered a good comparison area. It
was used to approximate what changes in crime would have been expected absent the identified intervention. Table 9.4 compares changes in reported crime
for the target and control areas between the fourth quarter of 1996 and fourth
quarter of 1997. The data indicate that the Eighth Precinct experienced substantial increases in many of the crime categories, whereas the target precincts
reported large decreases. Although the number of homicides in the Eighth Precinct remained steady at 11, noteworthy increases were reported in assaults,
burglaries, and gun-related assaults. Additionally, although the Eighth Precinct
did experience a 12 percent decrease in robberies, this change is substantially
smaller than what was observed for the Fourth and Ninth Precincts.
The information just presented suggests Detroit's Anti-Gang Initiative was
successful in reducing the occurrences of gang-related problems. While the
decreases between the two quarters reported in Table 9.4 are substantial, the
analysis does not determine if the level of crime during the intervention period
(January-December
1997) was statistically different from trends the city was
otherwise experiencing. Time-series analysis is a useful strategy for determining the significance of change in a pattern over an identified period. Preintervention and postintervention periods are compared to determine if trends during the intervention were significantly different than those anticipated based on
preintervention trends (McDowall et a!., 1980).
Figure 9.2 presents trends in gun-related crime for the target areas (Fourth
and Ninth Precincts) and the comparison area (Eighth Precinct). The two vertical lines demarcate the intervention period, January 1997 through August
1998, An initial review of the figure indicates that among the three precincts,
gun-related crime was generally higher in the Ninth Precinct and lowest in the
Fourth Precinct. However, considerable variation is evident especially during
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9.2 Comparison of Pre- and Postintervention
Effects for Target and Control Precincts

FIGURE

the intervention period. Gun-related crime decreased precipitously in the
Ninth Precinct from a high of nearly 300 in December of 1996 to nearly 100 in
March of 1997. Similarly, gun-related crimes generally decreased in the Fourth
Precinct during the intervention period, though increasing moderately toward
the latter stages of the initiative. Finally, figures for the Eighth Precinct do not
reveal similar patterns, but indicate that effects of seasonality were consistent
throughout the study period.
The purpose of time-series analysis is to determine if fluctuations in the
trends presented in Figure 9.2 are a function of trends that would have otherwise been manifest absent the AGI intervention, and also to control for the effects of seasonality on the likelihood of gun-related crime. For the Ninth Precinct, trends in gun-related crime were significantly lower after'the initiation
of the Anti-Gang Initiative than otherwise would be expected based on preintervention trends. The model, fitting the ARIMA (1,0,0) model and demonstrating an error structure without significant autocorrelation (Q > .05) (McDowall et a!., 1980), and controlling for the effects of seasonality, suggested the
intensive efforts in the Ninth Precinct reduced gun-related activity by an estimated 112 crimes per month.
The impact of the AGI was not statistically significant in the Fourth Pre.05). Because
cinct (0,1,1 ARIMA model) as it was the Ninth Precinct (Q
gun-related crime is a rarer event in the Fourth Precinct than in both the Ninth
and Eighth Precincts, it is plausible the null finding is an artifact of the smaller
numbers of offenses. For example, Figure 9.2 revealed that gun-related crime
barely reached 20 incidents in the Fourth Precinct in December 1997. Although
not statistically significant, the findings suggested gun-related crimes were decreased by 8 per month.
Similarly, findings from the Eighth Precinct (1,0,0 ARIMA model), or control precinct, indicated that although changes in gun-related crimes during the
intervention period were not significant (Q < .05), such crimes did decrease

<

234

PART III

SUPPRESSION-BASED

APPROACHES

TO GANGS & YOUTH

VIOLENCE
CHAPTER 9

by 6 per month on average. It does not appear that the limited number of observations would have played the same role in the analysis of the Eighth Precinct data as it was hypothesized to play in the Fourth.

CONCLUSIONS
The Detroit Anti-Gang Initiative largely represented an aggressive patrol and
suppression strategy of enforcement in two target precincts. While Detroit may
not be a typical city in terms of its size or crime patterns, it is fairly typical in
its structure of gangs. Gangs in Detroit are mainly small, neighborhood-based,
and not highly organized groups, some of which may be considerably involved
in weapons use and/or drug sales.
Over the period of the intervention and operation of the-AGI project, there
was a considerable decline in gun crimes in the target precincts, whereas the
number of such offenses rose in the comparison precinct. This was particularly
the case in the Ninth Precinct, where a statistically significant reduction of
gun crimes occurred. Perhaps more importantly, this reduction represented
112 fewer gun crimes, and thus a commensurate fewer number of victims, per
month in this precinct. Given the design of this study and available data, these
results cannot be directly attributed to the intervention. However, there is a
strong indication that these aggressive policing tactics contributed significantly
to this meaningful reduction.
Although the initiative was largely successful, several other aspects of the
project were less productive. There were several administrative problems with
the initiative that limited the availability of equipment and training to members
of the Gang Specialist Unit. Under the original program design, officers were
to be given the opportunity to attend specialized training for gang identification and enforcement strategies. Only limited training was delivered, and that
was near the end of the initiative. This lack of training, particularly earlier in the
project, was a continuing concern for many of the GSU officers.
Officers also reported problems with overly restrictive geographic assignments. The switch to a geographically based program resulted in concentrated
efforts at reducing gang-related activity in certain hot spots. Command staff
'continually referred to crime trends to make minor adjustments to target locations based on week-to-week changes in crime. However, interviews with
members of the GSU indicated that while many valued the idea of geographic.
responsibility, they also believed it artificially constrained their investigations at
times. The supervisors' commitment to this model restricted the movement
of officers to neighborhoods that bordered each precinct. Gang members and
other offenders are seldom aware of administrative boundaries and may move
in and out of various police boundaries as their social or criminal relationships
change. This represents a continuing dilemma in policing between maintaining
the integrity of the intervention through rules specifYing geographic assignment and at the same time recognizing that the nature of the gangs may at times
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call for a more flexible response. Given the nature of this issue and the history
of such geographically based interventions in other jurisdictions, the police department is to be commended for maintaining the integrity of this aspect of the
intervention.
Finally, the community partnerships and outreach aspects of the intervention were not fully developed components of the Detroit Anti-Gang Initiative.
Although theie were many examples ofGSU personnel meeting with community members, these activities were more often done on an ad hoc basis and thus
were not systematic and regularly recurring activities. Aggressive enforcement
policies have the potential to strain police-community relationships if members
of the community perceive enforcement efforts to be carried out in an unfair
manner. The DPD was able to gain the cooperation of community organizers
by identifYing high-crime, gang-saturated areas. However, involving community members more systematically by providing briefing materials after major
raids or monthly summaries of activities might have given the DPD a conduit
to garner additional support.
In spite of these drawbacks in fully implementing

the model, the Detroit

Anti-Gang Initiative demonstrates the considerable impact that concentrated aggressive gang enforcement can have on gun crimes and arguably gang behavior.

NOTES
1. Detroit's estimated 1993 poverty rate
was 39.6, and 33.1 for 1995 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
2000).

6. Anecdotal evidence from interviews
with Detroit gang officers in 1998 suggests
the continuing impact of these gangs on
the east side of Detroit.

2. Figures are based on raw data obtained
from the Detroit Police Department and
therefore do not necessarily correspond
exactly to data reported by the Michigan
State Police.

7. Although Taylor (1990) does not give
the specific name of this gang, it is presumed to be Young Boys Incorporated.

3. Named such because of its affiliation
with Norman Purple and his gang.
4. In 1943 the population of Detroit was
estimated to be approximately 2 million.
This figure, which is nearly double the
1999 population, is even more significant
w hen one considers that tens of thousands
of residents were not counted because they
were fighting in World War II (McGraw,
1999).
5. Taylor defines "scavenger" as "a person
who lives off the environment; survival
by means of criminal activities, loosely
organized; no definite leadership" (Taylor,
1990).

8. Mieczkowski (1986: 650) indicated
that self-reported earnings during peak
times of activity ranged as high as $3,000
during the course of a 16-hour workday
(650).
9. The figure is weighted for population
and accounts for the number of gang
members reported in each jurisdiction.
10. The figure is unweighted
population.

for

11. Data wete taken from the DUF Gun
Addendum that was administered between
1995 and 1997.
12. It is first important to note the study
population was juveniles rather than adults
as in the ADAM study.
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13. See Taylor, 1990, page 16. The Fourth
Precinct is located in the southwest section of Detroit and includes all or part of
the following neighborhoods: Chadsey,
Condon, Clark Park, Springwells, Delray,
and Boynton. The Ninth Precinct, located in the northeast section of Detroit,
includes all or parts of Airport, Conner,
Kettering, Jean, and Chandler Park. Gangs
in all of these areas are described as scavenger gangs.
14. Referring once again to Taylor's (1990)
analysis, the Eighth Precinct comprises all
or somc of the Greenf,eld and Harmony
Village neighborhoods (p. 16). There are
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several other neighborhoods included in
this precinct; however, they were not included in the initiative. Taylor (1990) says
gangs in the Eighth Precinct were considered "corporate" gangs, or highly organized gangs whose main pursuit is the acquisition of wealth. This differs from the
opinions of the GSU officers, who, at least
presently, consider gangs in the Eighth to
more closely resemble scavenger gangs.
15. These figures are conservative estimators because approximately four weekly
reports were missing. This problem affected the totals for the Ninth Precinct
most dramatically.
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INTRODUCTION
Civil gang injunctions (CGIs) are a legal tool for addressing the hold that entrenched gangs have on urban neighborhoods. Unlike some law enforcement
gang intervention strategies that focus on individuals or gangs without regard
to place, CGIs are spatially based, neighborhood-level interventions intended
to disrupt a gang's routine activities. As several police officers and attorneys have
told us, CGIs are not simply ways to attack a gang problem, they are also for the
sake of the neighborhood. The injunction targets specific individuals (and often
other unnamed gang members) who affect the daily lives of residents through
intimidation and public nuisances and restricts their activities within the boundaries of a defined geographic space.
The CGI asserts that as an unincorporated association, a gang has engaged
in criminal and other activities that constitute a public nuisance. Specific members are liable for civil action as a consequence of their membership in the association. The use of injunctions against gangs was pioneered as early as 1980, but
only since 1993 has the strategy become widespread in Los Angeles and Southern California. The accelerated use reflects the perceived successes of injunc-
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